A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns
the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s,
philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical
perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it
really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have
significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this
assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the
corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while
you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping
your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change,
disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences
are radically different.

Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as
well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first
time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism.
These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was
the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and essays
stating a number of important objections.

http://www.amazon.com/Disjunctivism-Contemporary-Readings-Readers-
Philosophy/dp/0262026554

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